The revolution delayed: 10 years of Hugo Chávez's rule

* A translation of a March 2008 interview conducted by the French
anarchist Charles Reeve with two members of the El Libertario group
www.nodo50.org/ellibertario in Caracas, the nation’s capital, which offers
some stark insights into the reality of the situation.

This month (February 2009) marks the tenth anniversary of Hugo Chávez’s coming to power in Venezuela, and ten years of the “Bolivarian revolution”. This process has included waves of state intervention in the economy and fervent rhetoric against US imperialism. But while some on the left see this Chavista movement as the new “socialism for the 21st century”, A more radical critique has argued that it is actually more like an old-fashioned attempt at modernisation by a technocratic élite (including an ex-situationist as second-in-command of the ministry of information and propaganda); that increased bureaucratic power over
capital is not inherently progressive; and that the “revolution” in Venezuela allows for very little working-class control or initiative from below.

Here we present a translation of a March 2008 interview conducted by theFrench anarchist ‘Charles Reeve’ with two members of the El Libertario group in Caracas, the nation’s capital, which offers some stark insights into the reality of the situation. Looking at various aspects of the Venezuelan economy and living standards in the country, it argues that Chavismo and the mythology of the “Bolivarian revolution” conceal a raft of neo-liberal reforms and attacks on workers’ rights, and that we must break out of the dynamics of Chávez vs. the opposition in order to build an autonomous working-class alternative.

º _The origins of “Chavismo”, between caudillismo and the social movements_

Charles Reeve (C.R.) – we are amazed by the shallowness of political
debate in Venezuela. All discussion centres on the “dynamics of Chavismo”.
Rarely do we see it analysed through the wider perspective of the general
Latin American situation, as a specific case of left populism. Questions
such as how to characterise the current period, what explains these
developments and the temporary weakening of US political control over the
region are hardly taken into account. This despite the fact that changes
in the political space occupied by the régime will largely depend on
external factors, such as the future path of US policy, transformations in
the Cuban system and finally the cycles of oil prices.

Miguel (M.) – There is a lot of talk nowadays of a left turn in Latin
America. There have indeed been several governments elected who belong to
traditional left tendencies. For us, there are two main currents. On the
one hand are governments brought to power after great social movements,
such as is the case in Bolivia and Brazil, countries with a long history
of struggle. Apart from these – and more particularly, in Venezuela - the
so-called “left” governments have not come to power off the back of social
movements or grassroots struggles. They belong to a cultural set more
linked to Latin American populism of the caudillo variety. It is clear in
our eyes that all such governments meet the needs of a situation of
political crisis. It is impossible to understand the rise of Chavismo
without looking back to the caracazo of 1989. These riots in Caracas left
thousands dead. The pact which had existed between the various forces in
politics was thus broken and society faced a crisis of governability. This
concern was most acute within the ruling class itself. All the more so
given that these riots opened up a cycle of struggle in Venezuelan
society, with the emergence of grassroots organisations independent of the
old left political parties. Some people called this “a new civil society”,
particularly as regards the student movement and even the movements in the
poor barrios. For example, the Human Rights group, with which I work, came
about in these years. The same went for environmentalist groups and
women’s groups. So people who identified with leftist ideas escaped the
control of the parties. For its part the workers’ movement mostly remained
dominated by social democracy (and the Acción Democrática party), with a
few fringes controlled by groups of the authoritarian Marxist left. During
the 90s there was real turmoil in Venezuelan society, with popular
struggles organised in opposition to A. Perez, the social-democrat
president responsible for the 1989 massacres. This turmoil led to huge
changes in society. Three years later, in 1992, there was an attempted
military coup: a recurrent event in the history of this country, where the
army has often intervened in political life. Despite their failure, within
a few years these putschist army men, in particular Chávez, had managed to
recuperate the whole of this popular resistance movement. Chávez’s appeal
in part came from the fact that he was able to make himself seem in tune
with the popular movements of the 90s.

That is how this powerful resistance movement fell behind this figure and
became part of a new institutional arrangement.
This was a dialectical integration: well known activists in these
movements were also on the look-out for some institutional role: in their
eyes, indispensable for carrying out their plans.

This “civil society” was new, having existed for barely a decade and had
carved out very little space of its own in society. It had little
experience in terms of concrete social engagement and anti-authoritarian
organising. So now, rather surprisingly, we find the cadres of this new
“civil society” in power with Chávez. The blank cheque they have given in
part results from this inexperience and lack of a concrete project. Here
we find the imprint of the country’s cultural make-up. Even if revolutions
define themselves by breaking with such paradigms, we have to say that
Chávez himself is repeating the whole caudillo, statist and militarist
tradition long established in Venezuela. He has breathed fresh life into
this culture.

From the start one of the characteristics of Chavismo has been
improvisation. We should attribute this to the lack of experience on the
part of most members of the grassroots movements who have joined Chávez.
Individuals who have never organised even a small co-operative were, like
a lightning flash, possessed with the idea of “forming co-operatives” and
found themselves at the head of the Ministry of Co-operatives… which soon
after decreed the creation of 200,000 co-operatives throughout the
country!

Venezuela is a society that has long lived off its oil revenue. The left
has always claimed that all is necessary for the distribution of this
revenue to be more equal is for the state to take control of oil
production… In Venezuela, controlling the state means controlling the oil.
A mechanical interpretation: once you have the oil, everything can be
sorted. Magical voluntarism!

I will return to the weakness of the theoretical analysis of “civil
society” groups which you have mentioned. We must understand that in
Venezuela we are today living through a rerun of the old Cold War left
schema based on confrontation between capitalism and the socialist
countries. Thanks to its oil resources and the importance of oil to the
world economy, the Chávez government today positions itself as one of the
leading forces in this conflict. Much as this confrontation existed before
the coming of Chavismo, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Eastern
Bloc, the forms of imperialist domination are not the same. It is as if
reality has changed but the Chavistas haven’t realised! The régime is
trying to answer new problems with old schemas. Both the Chavistas and the
opposition, still have Cold War theoretical stances. To put it another
way: given the lack of critical thinking and theorising, new practice or
fresh reflection, they fall back on old ideas and old strategies.

So Chávez has created the ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin
America and the Caribbean, a new institution intended to build new
relationships between Latin American countries and become a counterweight
to US hegemony. To achieve this it seeks alliance with the Russian
Federation, Iran and China… countries which in our eyes are part of world
capitalism. But there is all sorts of propaganda about Chavista
Venezuela’s leading role in a so-called new movement for anti-imperialist
“liberation”. As if this country is in the vanguard of some global
upheaval! Always following the old model of the Cold War, bloc against
bloc… that is how this government portrays itself to the outside world.
That some comrades in Europe and elsewhere promote this image saddens us,
since it means that they cannot see beyond the Chavista spectacle and
cannot see the real contradictions of the situation.

In the past, the left rarely won more than 10% in presidential elections
in Venezuela. In the early 90s the left had weak social roots, testimony
to the weakness of its ideas. Today, these organisations are in power with
Chávez and are doing all they can to take up once more all the positions
they have abandoned over the years. The construction of socialism,
building popular power, the relationship between state intervention of the
market… all the debates which ran out of steam in the 90s are now taken up
again by those who are now part of the state. We might point out that in
terms of anti-globalisation and Third Worldist groups worldwide, the
lessons being learnt from Venezuela are more than modest, particularly in
comparison with the Argentinian and Brazilian experiences. The only idea
is that of the epic anti-imperialist hero Chávez – David against Goliath.
In the last analysis, a bourgeois figure. But the theoretical elaboration
on this is practically nil.

To conclude, I will repeat the point that, looking at the political
activity taking place in Caracas, one can only say that the lessons we
have all learnt from the régime are exactly those we already knew before
Chávez came to power! They already had some history. That is the case, for
example, with the mobilisations of the “23 de Enero” barrio of Caracas (1)
where a large number of committees had been active since 1989. Chavismo is
given credit for the activity of these movements, but they did nothing but
follow their own logic.

º _“Chavismo”, a melting-pot_

C.R. - Let us discuss propaganda and ideological struggle and its
importance for the Chavista régime. It is banal to remark on the role of
the majority of leftist groups in this project, and more original to look
at the new Chavista nomenklatura and individuals such as Barreto, the
(locally) well-known professor who is currently mayor of Caracas. This is
a man who invited Negri to Caracas, speaks of “biopolitics”, claims the
tradition of Foucault and who has developed unusual post-modern theories.
He uses post-leftist rhetoric to carry out the same old bureaucratic
measures. A vast confusion – in which Chávez participates – citing
everyone from Trotsky to Chomsky and beyond… even more out of the ordinary
is the behaviour of a man like Eduardo Rothe, who wrote for
l’Internationale Situationniste and is now the number two in the Ministry
of Information/propaganda.

M. – One of the characteristics of South American populism is its woolly
ideology! What is the content of the “Bolivarian process”? It’s totally
empty! In reality the whole “process” centres on the Chávez personality
cult. When we discuss this with comrades from abroad we always emphasise
two points. Firstly, how it is simplistic to see Chavismo as the left and
the opposition as the right: the best way of not understanding anything!
Second, to take account of the economic context: Venezuela is experiencing
one of the richest periods of the last thirty years in terms of oil
revenue. We have to go back to the ‘70s and the nationalisation of the oil
by the social democrats to find an economic situation as favourable to the
ruling powers as this. We must also note that the structure of command in
the Venezuelan armed forces, the institution from which Chávez and most
leading figures in the current régime emerged, is less differentiated by
class than in most Latin American countries. The armed forces have allowed
for a certain degree of social mobility, and individuals from the poorer
classes’ access to a military career has been one of the ways of
redistributing oil revenue. That said, the Venezuelan army was formed
during the Cold War and until very recently was part of the American
counter-insurgency school. The armed forces were responsible for the
massacre in 1989. I want to emphasise there that there is absolutely no
leftwards dynamic in this institution. There are more conservative and
more nationalist sections of the army, and those who are both things at
once. There are army men close to the Communist Party and other left
parties like “Patria para Todos”. But many of those who initiated the
movement around Chávez, and who are today in his new PSUV, come from the
old social democratic tradition. The thing that brings this jumble
together is the leadership figure, the president! Between 2002 and 2004
this group consolidated itself against its enemies, namely threats of an
anti-Chavista coup or United States intervention. But from 2004 onwards
the rhythm of the mobilisation of Chavista and anti-Chavista forces came
to be determined by the electoral calendar. Their central objective is to
win votes. Taking this stance, a lid was put on the significant internal
differences in the Chavista camp in order to guarantee a united front
against the enemy.

It seems that this second period came to an end with the bad results on
2nd December 2007, when Chávez lost the referendum on constitutional
reform. The charm and the myth of the leader’s invulnerability took a hit,
and since then the differences among the Chavistas have been more clearly
visible. Chávez, for his part, has now done enough sloganising to breathe
new life into the iconography of the Venezuelan left. In doing so he has
counted on the support of individuals who in the past took part in
guerrilla and other such movements, legitimising his discourse as a left
discourse, as anti-conformist, as a clean break. Now a number of
personalities of the old left, as well as some from the new left, are
coming into the Chavista scene. We have mentioned the ex-situationist
Eduardo Rothe, but there have been others, like the former guerrilla
leader who became CEO of the nationalised oil company PDVSA… I will not
reduce all this to politically opportune posturing: there is also an
attempt to win ground inside a contradictory and shallow movement in order
to push their own agendas.

Isabel (I.) - the case of Barreto, the current mayor of Caracas (in 2008),
is indicative. He is a man who first spread his wings politically at the
university, starting from post-modernist political precepts. It is
important to remember that Chavism has never been a monolithic movement,
but one which adapts to circumstance and whose supporters have similarly
changed attitudes according to circumstances.

That is also its strength. The Chavismo which of the initial abortive
military coup; the Chavismo which wins elections; and the Chavismo which
survived the 2002 coup are all different things. At the moment we are
again experiencing change. In 2002, at the time of the anti-Chávez coup,
many activist and political factions were directly involved in the
institutions of state. Until then Chávez had never called himself a
socialist, Marxist, Marxist-Leninist or whatever… throughout these years
he had argued for a social project quite different from traditional left
perspectives.

C.R. - Do you mean to say that Chavismo is a confused ideological space, a
sort of “melting pot” where diverse tendencies co-exist and where each
current or clan looks to conquer ground to promote its ideas?

I. - You could say that. Until the results of the 2007 referendum, they
remained united against the common enemy. Since then, for the first time
deep disagreements have been expressed openly…

M. - I repeat, in Venezuela’s history left groups have rarely held power
and always lacked a “tribune of the masses”. Now, suddenly, they’re
experiencing a situation where there is talk of “socialism”, where there
is a charismatic figure capable of “mobilising the people”. These left
politicians now find themselves in harmony with these mobilisations. They
are part of the authorities and have a tribune of the people as
represented by Chávez. For these groups, this development is seen as a
“gain”. Now there is no question of abandoning “the processes of
government”! They are gaining ground and continue to justify anything and
everything in the name of this or that tactic. Above all they must avoid
losing the tribune represented by the régime. These groups are ready to
legitimise and justify anything.

º _“Chavismo” and the neo-liberal model_

I. - Chavismo has another characteristic beside its links with the
traditional left. The régime’s project is tied into the current
international situation, which supports a global drive for capitalist
rule. I will explain: nowadays it is easier to implement the plans of
neo-liberal capitalism in a country with a left-wing government which uses
populist slogans without provoking real mobilisation on the part of
workers. For us, that is Chavismo’s principal role. Of course, I am not
saying that all the people and groups who support Chávez are conscious of
this. I repeat, Chavismo does not have a homogenous supporter base. There
are those who think the régime is doing the best it can to improve the lot
of the people… there are even thous who are convinced that today we are
experiencing a unique opportunity to “build socialism”. We, for our part,
think that this neo-liberal role can be seen in the régime’s policies on
oil and trade, and indeed in its whole economic agenda. This manipulative
populist rhetoric covers up the real agenda of clearing the way for the
implementation of the neo-liberal model, to a greater extent than ever
before.

C.R. - Chavismo as the spearhead of neo-liberal policies: quite an
original take on things! From this standpoint, can we see the rise - or
the creation - of a new private sector emerging from the Chávez years: one
based on the new networks of patronage and corruption?

I. - But obviously! In Venezuela such networks have always been integral
to the functioning of society. Initially the Chavistas tried to break with
this set-up. But in reality there were but minor changes in the structures
of bureaucracy, and corruption and patronage continued. There are few
studies of this issue. But at an empircal level we can state that it is
plain to see in the oil and financial sectors where the government has
introduced its plans. In the co-operative sector, for example, cliques
have identifiably appropriated projects to build centres of economic power
from which they can make personal gains.

C.R. - What is the place of the military caste in these new structures of
economic power? Do they directly control any private enterprises?

I. - Almost all ministries are under the control of the military bureaucracy.

M. - We have to emphasise several different points here. In Venezuela,
given the importance of oil revenue to the economy, the state has always
subsidised private companies, like a sort of mixed capitalism. The
wealthiest bosses who have emerged have always had ties with the state.
Within global capitalism, Venezuela has fulfilled the role of cut-price
oil producer. With the current transformations, Venezuelan entrepreneurs
in traditional sectors like the service sector and manufacturing have been
progressively sidelined by entrepreneurs more linked to modern industries
like communication, transport and finance. These domestic developments are
linked to the evolution of globalised capitalism. The way things are
going, it looks like the new Chavista state has installed a new capitalist
caste whose role is to defend the central importance of oil to the
economy.

The top of the military bureaucracy have always finished their career in
the private sector, as landowners or executives. Today their economic role
has increased now that army men are in place at all levels of the state
apparatus. Chávez has particular reliance on the military bureaucracy,
which he has confidence in and which is charged with stepping up
efficiency in the management of the economy. It is a well-established
bureaucracy which benefits from significant material and financial
privileges and good living standards. What’s more, it benefits from total
legal impunity.

I. - The Venezuelan people have always looked upon their children’s access
to military careers in a favourable light, and as a means of social
advancement. That is why the government speaks of “soldiers, part of the
people”. But this is totally demagogic and fake: when you go into the
military, you are separated from the people.

º _Corruption protected by the “leader”_

C.R. - Let us return to the issue of corruption. Among the masses the
recurrent explanation given for the failures of the régime is corruption,
as if were some simple dysfunction. Well, firstly, corruption is actually
a “normal” part of the capitalist system. No capitalism without corruption
exists, and the capitalist classes came about and became strong on the
basis of corruption: the history of north American capitalism is a good
example of this. So is this an attempt at concealing the implementation of
a neo-liberal model which you have described? And people see this as a
mere dysfunction?

I. - This explanation has the advantage of keeping the image of the leader
intact: Chávez is a good leader but surrounded by bad, corrupt people.
This is a lie, but a useful lie which serves to protect the régime’s
populist image and emotional ties with the leader. Things would be
different if the workers were more aware of their rights and better
understood their situation. On the contrary, the constant complaints about
corruption express ambiguous attitudes: they are addressed to the
government and accept its authority. No matter what, you can rely on the
government to resolve your problems. The idea of ‘corruption’ serves the
interests of the régime.

I will give the example of life in the barrios. All this so-called
“socialist” process has done little to increase solidarity, self-help and
co-operation between people. On the contrary! If you live in a bad barrio,
you look to move to a less run-down one. In general you look to solve your
own needs rather than improving living conditions in general. The solution
for such problems is far from being seen as a collective effort. The
solution is always The Government. The idea of corruption is situated amid
this void of independent activity by the people themselves. It’s
unfortunate, but that’s how things are.

º _Propaganda and reality_

C.R. - It is not easy to compare the situation in Brazil with Venezuela.
The populism of the Partido dos Trabalhadores is different from Chavismo.
The story of the PT is one of a classic socialist party, emerging from a
powerful workers’ movement, whose cadre are absorbed into the state
apparatus. As we have discussed, the history of Chavismo is more linked to
the military revolt after the mass riots of 1989.

Here I shall mention the analysis of some of my friends in Brazil. They
argue that the PT’s coming to power was not the outcome of social
struggles but on the contrary brought to completion the crushing of
autonomous currents in these movements by the PT and trade union
bureaucracy. The PT’s victory was the political expression of the
normalisation of a radical social movement.

Among the people who support (”critically”, they say) the populist
régimes, in particular Chavismo, some have the idea that every
amelioration of living conditions represents a positive factor for future
struggles, and that we ought to support these régimes for that reason. You
are arguing the opposite, saying that the institutionalisation of popular
movements tends to enfeeble them. Firstly, it makes them dependent on the
state. We are not seeing any new attitudes emerging in the popular
consciousness, but rather a reinforcement of the values of letting others
have control, fatalism, individualism and atomisation. This is also
apparent in Brazil, where the establishment of an aid system for the poor
(Bolsa Familia) has made millions of poor proletarians dependent on a
miserable amount of money set aside by the government each month and
distributed to individuals by banks. This leads to individualisation and
atomisation. In these aid systems, attitudes of solidarity do not grow,
but in fact disappear.

What do you think of this argument that “despite everything, these régimes
are better than what there was before”?

I. - Solidarity is something that has to develop among communities of
workers, based on their own desires. But if everything is run according to
a state-imposed agenda, collective needs are not met, only those
determined from on high. Look at the so-called grassroots organisations
the régime talks about so much and which are often portrayed as “People’s
Power” or even “the Fifth Estate”. The organisations have always been
dependent on the state. After the 1989 caracazo we saw an independent
current among community organisations, but as we have said, these same
organisations have been incorporated into the new state and have become
vehicles of the Chavista project. Abandoning their autonomy in order to
strengthen a so-called revolutionary government, they legitimise their
stance by saying “but now things are going to get better!”. All this
expresses a number of failings. People have to understand that they can
organise independently of the state. But there is an enormous political
polarisation which dominates all these activities: you are with Chavismo
or against it. The Chavista grassroots organisations against the
oppositionist ones. The new communal councils should, in principle,
represent the communities who elect them. But in reality there are
Chavista ones where there is no place for critics and anti-Chavista ones
where Chavistas are not allowed. The form of these councils is determined
by the state. So where are the real, concrete interests of collectives
represented?

M. - For my part, I am not afraid to say that living standards have not
improved; people are living in ever worse conditions. This despite the
fact that Venezuela now has the highest GNP per capita in Latin America, a
figure comparable to some European countries. The working classes rely on
the help the government gives them. Of course, the existence of health
centres in the barrios is a good thing, when they’re running. But in this
country the situation of poor women, in particular as regards childbirth,
is deteriorating. The public health system is in a disastrous state.
Venezuelan prisons reproduce societal violence to the extent that they are
among the most violent on the continent. In 2007 alone there were 427
deaths in jails, out of a prison population of 20,000. This aggravation of
social problems is the expression of a social fragmentation which our
famous “revolutionary process” does nothing to combat. On the contrary, it
reinforces individualist attitudes. We are told that we are building “21st
century socialism” and yet what we see is an increased number of shopping
centres. Luxury car sales have never been so strong… All this shows the
flowering of values which have nothing to do with the attitudes socialists
have expressed throughout history. To conclude: there are slogans and
propaganda, but this does not correspond with the concrete results and is
not related to the means actually used. The Chávez government disposes of
enormous financial means thanks to its oil wealth, and also has immense
political capital. So all the official discourse can to explain the lack
of results is that one little word: imperialism….

I. - We must look beyond the current régime and beyond Chavismo. What
should be put into question are the habits of living and consuming in a
country which has lived off oil revenue for years. Venezuela is a society
where materialist alienation is very strong. The Latin American country
with most mobile phones, where women’s cosmetics are most widely sold, and
more… It is the ability to possess such goods which gives people the
impression of increased living standards. But the quality of food,
healthcare, education, and the ecological situation, are essentials which
do not fit into this picture.

M. - The situation in Caracas is a good example of this. Urban decay and
the loss of public space, social breakdown, everyday violence and the
decline in public transport are far from corresponding to what is
materially possible for the capital of an oil-producting country.

C.R. - The capitalist class appropriates most of the oil revenue, without
the slightest interest for meeting the general interests of society. At
this level there is seamless continuity between the régimes of the past
and Chavismo.

M. - Exactly! For us, nothing essential has changed. Among the ruling
class there are some who have broken with the new authorities and others
who support it. The best example is that of Gustavo Cisneros, one of the
big modern Venezuelan capitalists, a man connected to the world market, a
“global entrepreneur”. He manages the Venezuelan Coca Cola operation and
invests in the communications sector. This man carries out all his affairs
while maintaining excellent relations with the current government, which
he has a conciliatory and even eulogistic attitude towards. “Money has no
ideology”, he says!

º _Co-operatives in the service of casualisation_

C.R. - Now let’s talk about the co-operatives movement. A Venezuelan
friend said that the government’s co-operatives movement, in the last
analysis, amounts to a sort of institutionalisation of labour precarity
and black market work. He mentioned the recent (2007) strike by dustmen in
part of Caracas, during which the strikers asked for Barreto, mayor of
Caracas, to intervene - he who quotes Foucault and invited Toni Negri
over. The mayor told them that he could do nothing, since they had
accepted the transformation of the old company into a co-operative. Which
meant that there was no collective bargaining, since the workers were
considered to be associates of the co-operative on the same level as the
administrators!

M. - Of course, we have a totally different idea of co-operatives. For us,
a co-operative is an initiative which comes from below. For the Chavistas,
on the contrary, enterprises in what they now call the “social economy
sector” must operate in the form of state-aided co-operatives. Every day
people start organising co-operatives - people who are totally foreign to
the spirit and practice of co-operativism… because it is the quickest way
of getting contracts and state credit! In many industries the law obliges
the state to give priority of tenders to “co-operatives” above private
enterprises. So many malign people have started creating co-operatives in
order to win contracts with government bodies. That as the case with the
public roads enterprise you mentioned. A private enterprise was thus
transformed inter a co-operative to win the tender, and at a stroke the
workers lost all their rights and bonuses. They now have three-month
renewable contracts, such that the “co-operativist” (in reality, the new
name for the boss!) has no duties towards them. Thanks to this lie, after
a few months it could be said that there were 200,000 co-operatives… All
this in order to make propaganda showing that society has changed. But it
is all artificial, created by decree.

I. - I would add that, after the oil workers’ strike, the government
learned that it had to control the world of work. First it explained that
the state would create a new form of organisation based on solidarity and
where all workers would benefit from the same privileges. The
co-operatives! At a stroke the government broke the services contracts it
had with private companies (particularly for cleaning), which by law had
to pay workers ’social bonuses’. The workers were laid off and forced to
seek temporary work with these co-operatives now dealing with the state.
They lost the bonuses and rights which they had previously (in theory at
least) had. Moreover, many of these co-operatives disappeared as soon as
they were created. So we are witnessing, as your friend is right to
emphasise, the casualisation of work.

º _Political pressure in the workplace_

M. - All this is part of a broader tendency towards casualisation and
“flexibility” in Venezuelans’ work conditions. The government’s recurrent
discourse about trade unions is part of the same agenda. The government
never ceases to emphasise the need to integrate the trade unions into the
new party structures.

The state is one of the main employers in Venezuela. After more than six
years, 425 collective bargaining agreements for public sector workers are
still waiting to be renegotiated! So there you go: a so-called socialist
and revolutionary government which refuses to negotiate the collective
deals for its own employees. They don’t give a damn about these workers’
needs! And here we are talking about sectors which are fundamental to the
functioning of the state, such as hospital workers and firefighters. Add
to that the fact that the régime has pushed to the limit the loyalty of
public sector workers to the state, which has always existed
traditionally. You will not be recruited if you do not show Chavista
sympathies, and you could even lose your job. The 2004 presidential recall
referendum came about after a national petition, which is a constitutional
right. Thirty percent of registered voters can demand a referendum.
Oppositionists went around collecting signatures, and - we don’t know how
- they were posted on a web page “Here are the people who signed against
Chávez”! So what was meant to be private and confidential became public.
There were numerous lay-offs on the basis of this list, and a significant
degree of administrative harassment. A nasty little affair, and the
international left said nothing! From 2002 to 2004 the polarisation in
society reached its height. You went into a public office for some
administrative matter or to do some papers, and were asked “Did you
sign?”: meaning, “did you sign against Chávez?”! Since I am not even on
the electoral lists, I was fine…

Sure, in all societies there is political discrimination, but in Venezuela
it is truly scandalous. If you want to work in a public service it is
absolutely essential that you can prove your sympathy towards the régime.
Another thing which you hear more and more of is the obligation for state
functionaries to participate in the big demonstrations to support the
president - sometimes on weekends - as if it was work time.

I. - I will add a concrete example. A few months ago the president of the
Institute for Consumer Protection, INDECO, publicly stated that if a
supermarket refused to sell products under the pretext of problems with
their inventory, in fact they were hiding attempts at monopoly. This was a
lie, since there is a real lack of goods. Because of this, he was replaced
by a representative of a harder Chavista bent. This individual had already
had a number of ministerial posts and had purged everywhere he had worked!
Upon his arrival at INDECO he started again - service directors, although
mostly Chavistas - were dragged out of their offices by heavies and were
only allowed to take away their personal possessions. My sister works for
this body. Although not a Chavista, she had never had any problems at work
before. But in the mix of this re-organisation of the institution, they
forced her as well as her colleagues to participate in the 27th March 2007
march in support of Chávez. The pressure became so unbearable that my
sister ended up resigning.

C.R. - Do you think that this hardening of the régime and this obsession
with total control will end up counter-productive, weakening its
popularity? Problems are mounting and they find ever more bureaucratic
answers.

I. - Yes, this clean-up justified in the name of the Chavista paranoia
about the next coup, in fact means strengthening totalitarian tendencies.

º _The renewal of social struggles under Chavismo_

C.R. - In the first months of 2008 we saw the development of working-class
struggles in Venezuela, in sectors as diverse as steel works and
hospitals. In a society extremely polarised between pro and anti
Chavistas, the trade union movement appears sharply divided, between the
old anti-Chavista social democrat unions, the new Chavista unions and
still others who are more politically independent, like the metalworkers’
union. In the current circumstances every struggle tends to be
characterised as ‘manipulated’. The recent strike threat by steelworkers
was immediately attacked by the Minister of Labour as “manipulated by the
opposition”. Today, what degree of autonomy is possible for struggles?

M. - We think that the results of the 2nd December 2007 referendum
represent a turning point. That day, the Chavista government announced
that it was to embark on a process of self-critique. By comparison to what
had gone before, we could say to ourselves “look, something positive”. But
the plan was never given any substance! For years we have been living to
the rhythm of the electoral process. It was said that the referendum
result could perhaps bring about a movement of struggle and that there was
at least a change for social movements to find their own dynamics,
political space and outlooks. We are indifferent to whether the individual
personnel are Chavistas or oppositionists: the state is unable to satisfy
the demands of struggles, and the space for autonomous action has to
increase.

On International Women’s Day the Chavista women’s organisations mobilised
against imperialism! What was the relationship of this with the needs of
women here: help with maternity, health conditions and domestic violence?
Similarly, the student movement that broke out in 2007 against the closure
of a TV station was unable to formulate its own demands. For their part,
the Chavista students were also mobilised, but this time in favour of the
closure. That was it! And what were their demands about the conditions of
students and the socialist educational agenda? They had none! They had no
objectives of their own. On both sides the mobilisations were organised
from above. In reality, we have to say, sadly, that the people are
prisoners of the electoral calendar and its partisanship. All energies and
all mobilisations, whether Chavista or anti-Chavista, are geared towards
electoralism.

I. - It used to be that it was impossible to go on strike in an election
year without being accused of being a “guarimbero” (2). In 2007 there was
a transport strike, the small owners demanding an increase in ticket
prices and arguing that they did not earn enough to maintain the lines.
The government paid no attention to their demands and everyone dug their
heels in. So the workers who protested against the lack of transport were
in turn accused of being “guarimberos”. What’s more, the government
threatened to create a “co-operative” (see!) which would replace the lines
on strike. Of course, there was no possibility of solidarity emerging. The
same thing happened in the strikes by teachers and by doctors in the
public health system. The doctors occupied the hospitals and demanded the
renegotiation of their deal. The government refused any discussion and
called them “guarimberos”. So then Chávez met with a group of pro-régime
doctors in a large theatre hall in Caracas and magnanimously said to them
“I’ll give you a 30% raise!”. With no discussion of the deal! People end
up defeated, giving in to the authoritarian and demagogic methods of the
government.

C.R. - So you’re suggesting that this situation is now changing…

I. - Yes, I think today attitudes are more open. People say “I am neither
of the opposition nor a “guarimbero”, I am not a Chavista - or not - but
am a worker and want to be listened to!”. We saw this recently in the
nursery nurses’ and transport workers’ strikes. “We are workers and we
want our rights respected”. These movements represent a change in people’s
consciousness.

M. - There are contradictions between the leadership of the régime, who
are constantly trying to channel protests into the electoralist camp, and
the deep discontent of the base, the poorest layers of the population who
tend to pose their demands up front. We can only hope that this divide is
accentuated. It is this contradiction which can create a space for people
to win back their own sets of objectives and their own interests. This is
the only way that, in the long term, autonomous space can be created.

º _Dissent among the Chavistas_

I. - As we have already emphasised, the political process of Chavismo has
experienced a series of changes. Since 2007, two things have become clear:
the first is that Chávez could lose power. The second is that Chávez does
not necessarily represent the interests of the majority of the population.
In December 2007, we saw that the project Chávez argues for has raised a
number of doubts, even among the Chavista left, some sections of which
were very critical. The fragmentation was real. You could see that
Chávez’s charisma was weakening. That is why we think that at the present
time, what is most interesting politically is what is happening inside the
Chavista movement and the critiques arising in its ranks. It represents
the discontent of activists who feel that their political space is more
and more controlled from above. Since last year, the “missions” (3) have
been going very badly, with less and less financial means. For example,
half of the “Barrio adentro” (4) health centres have been shut for want of
equipment, medicine or doctors… The “Robinson mission”, the avant-garde of
the “missions”, designed to combat illiteracy, is no more. Other
“missions” have not given the expected results. We are witnessing a crisis
of expectations. The first two years, propaganda was still able to pretend
that the process was going ahead as planned and we only had to wait. The
results could be manipulated for electoral ends. But when, after four or
five years in power, there are still no improvements… This is true with
the universities too - Chávez initially promised twelve new universities,
then thirty… but nothing ever happened… After six years of unconditional
popular support, the hopes ended up collapsing, which explains the current
implosion of the régime.

M. - The results of the December 2007 referendum confirmed our
expectations: the Chavista public had nothing to do with a “socialist
movement” and did not at all identify with the so-called socialist
project. The majority of the Chavista electorate voted against his
socialist constitution. But still Chávez continues to have strong
emotional ties to the masses. There is nothing socialist or revolutionary
about this: it is mobilisation around a charismatic figure, Hugo Chávez.

I. - There is a joke people tell about Chávez, of coarse Venezuelan taste.
It’s the story where the fiancé asks his fiancée to go to bed with him,
and she says “No my love, not now!”. And he insists, “But yes, but yes,
but yes!”. Chávez proposes a socialist constitution and the people say no,
we don’t want it! Instead of going forward with a positive alternative he
tenses up and shows himself to be more authoritarian. After all, this guy
is a soldier. This attitude leads to division, which is almost emotional
in type, since Chávez is an emotional figure. Notwithstanding, if Chávez
happens to decide to use authoritarian means to resolve some problem of
the masses, the charismatic ties can be patched up again.

M. - One further aspect must not go without mention - the importance
Chavismo gives to international affairs. The support he gives to
“friendly” régimes is less and less tolerated. “He is busy with others and
not us!”. “Why does Chávez say that he wants to help them build hospitals
in Nicaragua when the ones here are in such a pathetic state?”. This is
what we are accustomed to hear: “We want answers to the problems here, and
now!”. After the defeat of the December 2007 referendum Chávez did
everything he could to recover his image on the international level. So
that’s why we have this constant show, the world a stage.

º _The spectre of anarchy?_

C.R. - In March 2008 a plain clothes policeman put a bomb in the
headquarters of the bosses’ organisation. A man linked to the régime, he
did it with his policeman’s card in is pocket! The Minister of the
Interior spoke of the actions of a “small anarchist group”… Why speak of
an anarchist group in reference to an action which was, by all accounts,
an operation of the secret services?

M. - Chávez’s Interior Minister is one of the most sinister characters in
the régime. He is a mercenary, a man who made his career in the army’s
secret services and responsible for the massacre of a guerrilla group in
1988.

I. - This sort of talk is nothing new. Each time there are actions which
take place outside the control of the régime’s institutions and
organisations, they cry “anarchism”. Chávez himself came on TV to say that
this terrorist action was the work of “anarchist groups”. Of course, we
could get worried that this was part of a clamp-down strategy, but I think
it’s more that it’s an easy explanation. As yet there have been no
consequences for us as a result of our activism. We are few in number, but
are on our guard. In any case, at a recent meeting of his new PSUV party
Chávez said “There is no place for anarchists in the PSUV”. There is a
place for “obedient, critical socialists” but not for anarchists
(laughter).

º _“Revolutionary tourism”_

C.R. - You often refer to “revolutionary tourism”… in early March 2008, in
the TV programme “Alo Presidente!” Chávez appeared, surrounded by a group
of young members of the German party Die Linke.

M. - What happened with the anarchist movement in Cuba is particularly of
interest, given the resemblance between the two situations. They are two
governments who present themselves to the outside world as revolutionary
and progressive. So the régime chooses a certain number of sights for
sympathisers to go and tour round. But this is quite the caricature: they
organise international conferences on occupied factories without the
participants visiting a single occupied workplace. They organise big
international Masses, the World Social Forum, the International Camp of
Anti-imperialist Youth, the International Forum of Intellectuals for
Peace, etc. All this as an attempt to constantly feed the propaganda and
publicity for the régime.

I. - There is one “revolutionary tourism” run by the state, and another
more spontaneous kind involving people who have certain hopes and
expectations about Venezuela. I think that the people who come in the
latter state of mind are more free and ultimately see more than those who
visit under the control of the state. Celebrities like Noam Chomsky and
Naomi Campell come, are led around some barrio under construction for the
benefit of the poor, to some co-operatives or to some state farm. Their
visits are filmed in order to make propaganda.

M. - We know that most people who come here want to see what they expect
to see. Like those who visit Cuba. So it all depends on their ideological
training. Visitors from more libertarian and critical backgrounds can
accept seeing the good and the bad, while those from more traditional
Marxist Leninist groups, Guevarists and Maoists, tend to confirm in their
heads what propaganda has told them. For our part, whenever we meet
comrades from abroad we tell them what we think of the situation. But we
also say that they ought not just take our word for it, just as they
shouldn’t believe the government! They have to open their eyes, visit what
you can visit, walk around Caracas and the towns of the interior.

º _Debord, Bolivar and the avatars of propaganda_

C.R. - Gabriel, you are a keen reader of Guy Debord. What use would you
make of his writings in order to understanding Venezuelan society?

M. - I think that thirty years ago some words had a certain meaning - for
example, if you were an anti-imperialist you aligned yourself with one of
the Cold War blocs. Today, in a period of capitalist globalisation, you
can call yourself an anti-imperialist and remain a partisan of
neo-liberalism… In Venezuela socialists’ mentality is highly eccentric and
you can’t be sure of what is being said. The spectacle as a representation
of reality greatly interests me in understanding the situation I see. I
think that the Chavista phenomenon is not analysed in a satisfactory
manner by us or anyone else. The results of the December 2007 referendum
surprised all intellectuals whether of left or right. So we must continue
to reflect.

C.R. - But it is a purely electoral rejection. What it really means is
that people do not totally accept the image of reality portrayed by
propaganda and that it does not conform to the reality of social
relations. Which also implies that the forms of domination are in crisis.

M. - Without doubt. Look at the Bolivar myth. It is the myth fundamental
to Venezuelan nationalism, the myth of the liberator. It means that within
nationalism there is this historic role for Venezuela, predestined to
fight for the liberation of the Latin American peoples. With two
corollaries: the Venezuelan has a universal epic and heroic role; and
Venezuela is a rich country with poorly distributed wealth. Chávez
perfectly embodies this culture. He is the man predestined to fight a
second independence struggle, against the United States.

I. - The hiatus came when people started to realise that the political
remedies were far from enough to meet their needs. But there was this
image of the régime and Chávez. Plans for the future collapsed faced with
the disasters of everyday life. The régime drew much of its strength from
cultural aspects: nationalism and in particular the image of the régime
abroad. “Bolivarian socialism” and “21st century socialism” were presented
as being able to answer concrete questions of hunger, housing and living
conditions. In the elaboration of this propaganda it was necessary to give
pride of place to people like Juan Barreto (mayor of Caracas) and Andrés
Izarra. They knew how to sell Chavismo and the image of the régime to the
outside world. Andrés Izarra, whose closest advisor is the ex-situationist
Eduardo Rothe, is a leading figure in the régime. He dreamt up the
document “If I was Venezuelan I would vote for Chávez” which all the
“progressive” North American and European intellectuals signed. The idea
was to show that the Chavistas weren’t alone in the world.

C.R. - But all this was just a rerun of history… it’s in the tradition of
historic Stalinism, the congresses of “progressive” artists and
intellectuals in support of this or that progressive régime…

I. - Yes, for you it’s déjà vu. But you must understand that here in
Venezuelan this is a totally new situation. The country came out of a long
reign of social-democratic rule financed by oil revenue and directly tied
to the USA. These conflicts between left and right, neo-liberalism and
anti-neo-liberalism, are new ideological struggles for this society.

M. - My father was a rank-and-file member of the social democratic Acción
Democrática. Later he abandoned politics. The oil was flowing, he had
money and work and made his living. Today his is a Chavista and has
‘discovered’ the Cuban revolution! Chavistas’ attitudes are greatly naive.
Now they are finding out about all these questions, as if they were
experiencing some belated revolutionary adolescence…

º _The condition of women: advances and retreats_

C.R. - Have there been significant changes in the condition of women?

I. - I am very pessimistic. Many women’s organisations have been
integrated into the state. The régime itself has created various women’s
bodies such as the Casa de la mujer. Women active in society are
integrated into the work of such institutions. Only a small number have
pursued work at grassroots level.

In Venezuela the image of women in a consumerist world is above all
characterised by association with sexual objectification. Every advert is
about woman and her body. What are presented as the needs of women have
nothing to do with women’s specific interests. So, unfortunately, woman is
reduced to reproducing sexist ideas. If we want to measure women’s access
to positions of authority, we can see that the régime has established a
certain parity. For example, if you have a job in public administration
you’ll have the same salary as a man would. The régime has also placed
several women in positions of political responsibility. But these posts
reproduce the system of oppression within the authorities themselves. They
do not smash the structures of the system, but reproduce it with the
figure of the woman-in-power.

Through cultural factors and the weight of tradition, the fact is that in
Venezuela the question of women’s conditions has up until now led to very
few demands of their own. This has left the women’s movement more
vulnerable to traditional political dynamics.

A telling example. We have a law, two of whose most significant aritcles
were revoked by the Chavista régime. According to one article, if a woman
was attacked in her home by her husband or partner, he would be banned
from returning home for 72 hours after his detention. This article was
wiped deleted from the law. Another article was revoked with the
consequence that if the home belongs to the man, the woman and the kids
have to leave if they separate. That tells you well enough the weakness of
women’s cause in the current climate.

In Venezuela the issue of contraception is not taboo, even if it is a very
religious country and we know how religion weighs on this matter.
Contraceptives are freely on sale and distributed in schools, while the
morning-after-pill is also available. There are many types of pills, some
of which are not too expensive and are relatively accessible to young
people. On the contrary, abortion is not allowed. Only miscarriage is
recognised as abortion. There is also the problem of very young women
having kids. I see that mostly as a cultural problem. Childbirth here
remains the central thing which makes a woman a woman. A couple like us,
in our thirties, without kids, are very rare. Everyone criticises you and
most people think of it as proof that we are not at all normal. Here,
childbirth is something fundamental. In the poorest layers of society
motherhood is seen as a way out. Giving birth means young girls can leave
their homes - often places of repression and violence against women - and
start their lives again somewhere else. But, of course, violence is
reproduced in the new circumstances, nothing changes and the demands for a
change in women’s conditions is let drift. However, they do not see it
like this, and for them motherhood is a means of starting afresh. It is a
contradiction which is obvious to us, but it isn’t for young mothers.

º _The discovery of libertarian ideas_

C.R. - How did you arrive at libertarian ideas?

I. - I studied sociology and took part in an editorial co-operative linked
to the university. I was on the left, from a social-democratic background,
but lots about the Marxist-Leninists and Trotskyists didn’t appeal to me.
I grew closer to young anarchists and was also influenced by reading
Camus.

M. - For me the crucial moment was meeting an old Spanish anarchist who
lived in my small town. As a young man I saw Guevara as a heroic Don
Quijote figure, but I didn’t understand why my here was implicated in a
political and social project involving the Soviet Union, an empire
carrying out horrors in Afghanistan and dominated over other countries.
When I found anarchist ideas, they answered my questions. I was won over.
That was when I met the old anarchist who lived an hour away from me in a
little farming town called Nirgua. He started giving me literature. This
old anarchist was the first man in Venezuela to make pirate books - not to
make money but to make them accessible to more people. Visiting him, I
appreciated his ethics, his way of life, and his coherence. The Marxists
who I knew had a clear idea of revolution but day-to-day behaved
themselves in a manner I disapproved of. They had a double life - one as a
militant, one day-to-day. There was a separation. So I read a lot and
arriving in Caracas I made contact with the small anarchist circles. I
also knew two old members of the Spanish CNT, Civil War exiles living in
Caracas and with who I established strong emotional bonds. Later, one died
and only Antonio Serrano was left. The old comrade from my little town is
still alive and a few years ago we organised a meeting of young anarchists
at his place. Venezuelan anarchism lacks real historical roots, making it
less dogmatic.

C.R. - Tell us a bit about your magazine El Libertario.

M. - At first it wasn’t easy. We were part of the milieu comprising
leftists and organisations from human rights campaigners to ecologists.
With the coming of Chavismo, everything was quickly polarised and almost
all of these organisations were integrated into Chavismo. But not us! The
first years were terrible. We were completely isolated. After 2002,
criticising the régime became an act of courage. In producing our little
magazine - 1,500 copies per issue - I lost 90% of my friends, whether
Chavista or anti-Chavista. No-one talked to me any more! If we criticised
the opposition we were taken for Chavistas, if we criticised Chavismo we
were treated like members of the opposition. And if you criticise the
state you are accused of being an imperialist agent, a petit bourgeois
intellectual and all the rest… As we were overcome with criticism and
rebuttals we were forced to refine our arguments. We went beyond critical
theory and started making analysis of concrete situations.

I. - Those who criticised us were far from constructive. They did not
discuss our arguments and ideas. It was always at the level of personal
rebuttals and breaking emotional ties. We felt very isolated.

M. - After the 2002 coup attempt against Chávez we were explicitly
threatened with death. All this because we distributed a communiqué where
we wrote “Neither Chávez nor Carmona, for self-management and life!”. Some
went as far as saying that El Libertario had supported the coup d’état!
Today the situation has changed. The readership of El Libertario certainly
goes beyond our own milieu. The magazine is now read by people on the left
looking for an alternative. We distribute 2,500 issues every two months,
60% by face-to-face sales. Our web page also gets a lot of hits. We’re
always here, and we’ll go on!

====================
Notes (by Marco G.)

(1) The 23rd January barrio was the first high-rise estate built in
Caracas. It is high up, a stone’s throw from the presidential palace,
close to the capital’s administrative centre. This very poor barrio has
for 50 years symbolised a high degree of struggle and clashes with the
forces of order. The actions of its residents played a decisive role in
bringing down the last dictatorship on 23rd January 1958… hence the name.
Since, there has been a strong presence of leftist and far-left groups,
cultural groups and various barrio associations.

(2) A “guarimba” is something concealed, and by extension, a clandestine
meeting of “wrong-doers”. In Chavista language the term “guarimbero”
applies to all those who, for one reason or another, loudly protest
against the situation. Treading them as such, it is understood that they
are subversive forces disguised as honest citizens, or else individuals
manipulated by the opposition.

(3) After the failed April 2002 coup the Chávez government launched a
programme of misiones (missions), far-reaching projects aimed at improving
various aspects of the lives of the poorest people, in particular as
regards health, education and nutrition. These misiones are organised and
directly financed by the state oil firm PDVSA. They work outside of the
control of the services of the corresponding ministries and are not
subject - even at a formal level - to any parliamentary control.

(4) The Mision Barrio Adentro (mission at the heart of the neighbourhood)
is the mission designed to improve medical awareness in poor and rural
areas (preventative medicine). This mission is based on Health Centres -
free medical offices with doctors lodging in the district. The large
majority of these doctors are Cubans (over 20,000) put at Chávez’s
disposal by the Cuban state, which is supplied with petrol in return. An
undefined number of these doctors have since disappeared into the wild…
some have found refuge in Colombia. A particular form of set-up has been
designed with the goal of supplying the health centre and the doctors’
living space under the same roof. Many thousands of such buildings have
been set up in the barrios of the biggest towns.

[For more info about Venezuela and Venezuelan anarchists, in Spanish,
English & other languages, see the website www.nodo50.org/ellibertario]